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Philosopher Alan Gewirth holds that refleclive, 
rational agents are logically compelled to accept and 
respeclthe rights of others.' I have argued that his 
reasoning implies that both so-called "marginal" 
humans and many nonhuman animals must be included 
in the sphere of morally considerable beings.2 Frank 
De Roose has taken issue with Gewirth's purported 
justification of morality in his recent article, 
"Pluhar on Methods of Justification." 3 Citing 
several other critics of Gewirth, De Roose argues 
that logic does not dictate the shift from agency to 
moral agency. I shall argue here that this critique of 
Gewirth is mistaken, although it is quite true that 
logic, in an important sense, is not a guarantee of 
morality. 
Let us begin with a brief sketch of Gewirth's line 
of reasoning. Moral codes are action guides and must 
be understood within the context of agency. Only 
agents, who (j) are able to control their own 
behavior, (ii) have knowledge of the relevant 
proximate circumstances of their actions, and (iii) 
have purposes they wish to fulfill,4 are capable of 
action. When we take the poInt of view of any 
particular reflective. rational agent. Gewirth 
argues. we can see how that agent logically must 
accept the view that others are as worthy of moral 
concern as she believes herself to be. (Of course. he 
does not claim that agents all actually go through the 
steps of the argument which follows. He is offering 
a rational reconstruction. not a psychological 
thesis,) 
First. the reflective agent can see that action of 
any kind has two necessary preconditions or 
"generic features": (1) the ability to have purposes 
or goals, and (2) the freedom which is required to 
pursue those goals. In order to have goals, one must 
in turn be alive. have a certain minimal quality of 
life, and have certain basic mental and physical 
capabilities. Gewirth combines these requirements 
for the first generic feature of action under the 
heading of "well-being." 5 Thus. the reflective agent 
who wants to pursue her goals must also value her 
well-being and freedom. and hold that they are good: 
(1) "My freedom and well-being are necessary 
[i.e .• are required for action in pursuit of 
goals l goods." 6 
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Note that Gewirth i~ not claiming that the agent'~ 
freedom and well-being are good; his point is that the 
reneelive agent must !lQlQ.them, as generic features 
of aelion, to be good, Even a self-destruelive agent 
contemplating suicide must value the freedom and 
well-being needed at that moment to carry out her 
purpose. 
The agent's realization that her freedom and 
well-being are requirements for the achievement of 
her goals leads her to prescribe that 
(2) "I must have freedom and well-being."? 
This prescriptive claim in turn leads the agent to 
claim that she is entitled to freedom and well-being: 
(3) '" have rights to freedom and well-being."S 
Note once again that Gewirth is not arguing that the 
agent ~ these fundamental, "generic," rights; he 
is saying that she ~ or accepts that she does. as 
an agent who wishes to pursue her goals. 
Gewirth uses an indireel proof to show that the 
agent logically must claim these generic rights for 
herself. If she were to deny (3), she would also 
have to deny that 
(4) "All other persons ought at least to refrain 
from removing or Interfering with my 
freedom and well-being." 9 
But if she denies (4). the agent must accept the 
following substitute premise: 
(4') "Others persons may (i.e" it is permissible 
that other persons) remove or Interfere with 
my freedom and well-being." 10 
However, (4') contradiels (2): "I must have 
freedom and well-being." Since the agent ID.!! agent 
must accept (2). she must then deny (4'). Since (4') 
follows from the rejection of (3), the agent must 
then claim that she has rights to the preconditions 
for agency, 
No. so far the agent has not made a moral claim. 
The normative claim in (3) is prudential. because it 
concerns the furthering of her interests alone. The 
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~hifl from the prudential to the moral point of view, 
according to which others' interests count too, 
begins with the agent's justification of the rights 
claim made in (3). As Gewirth points out, rights-
claims, as opposed to bald demands. are claims that 
one is entitled to or Qy§, certain behavior on the part 
of others; hence, they need to be warranted. II The 
agent who refleels on her rights-claim realizes that 
it is warranted by the simple fael that she has 
purposes she wants to fulfill; i.e., she is "a 
prospeelive purposive agent." This is the most 
basic "practical justifying reason" which can ever 
be given. As one who wishes to act. she must claim 
or advocate that she is entitled to the conditions 
which make aelion possible. Thus. she accepts 
(5) "I have rights to freedom and well-being 
because , am a prospective purposive 
agent." 12 
The next stage In the shift from the prudential to the 
moral point of view comes with the acceptance of the 
principle of universalizability: 
(6) "If the having of some quality Q is a sufficient 
condition of some predicate P's belonging to 
some individual S. then P must also belong to 
all other subjects that have Q." 13 
It follows. Gewirth argues, that 
(7) "All prospective purposive agents have rights 
to freedom and well-being." 1'1 
This is a moral claim, not merely a prudential one, 
because it implies that others besides oneself are 
entitled to have their freedom and well-being 
respected. It grounds what Gewirth calls "The 
Supreme Principle of Morality": 
(8) "Act in accord with the generic rights of your 
recipients as well as of yourself. It (the 
Principle of Generic Consistency [PGCJ)15 
<AJr sketch of Gewirth's argument is now 
complete: If he is right. reflective agents are 
compelled by no less than logical consistency to take 
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the moral point of view. Gewirth's reasoning has 
enormously important implications. It implies that 
the rational agent logically must accord (prima facie) 
rights of freedom and well-being to every individual 
who has purposes he or she wants to fulfill. I have 
argued elsewhere that even those agents who are 
intellectually incapable of reasoning through the 
steps which lead to the PGC must have these rights 
accorded to them.lf> Agents who cannot be moral 
agents require the preconditions of agency in order 
to act, just as intellectually better endowed agents 
do. It follows that many animals. namely those who 
exhibit what Tom Regan has called "preference 
autonomy," J7 would also logically have to be 
accorded rights. 18 Finally, beings who have 
preferences but lack the mental or physical ability to 
satisfy them, would at least have to be accorded the 
right to well-being, even though their freedom might 
have to be limited for their own and others' 
protection, 19 Very young or "marginal" humans 
would thus also be morally considerable. Agents who 
deliberately refuse to hold that these others have 
rights are guilty of the most glaring logical fallacy of 
all. if Gewirth's line of reasoning is correct: self-
contradiction. 
But ~ Gewirth's line of reasoning correct? Many 
objectIons have been raIsed against It. Gewirth 
anticipated and answered most of these objections 
himself in Reason and Morality. Some additional 
objections have been raised against it by critics and 
addressed by Gewirth In the most recent book on his 
Ylews,20 Frank De Roose has now argued that 
although Gewirth has indeed correctly shown that 
reflective agents must claim the rights to freedom 
and well-being for themselves, he has not shown that 
agents must hold that others have these rights.21 
Paraphrasing R.M. Hare, De Roose charges that 
Gewirth is himself guilty of a logical fallacy: the 
equivocation of "having a right" with "claIming a 
right. .. 22 From the "relatively uncontroversial" 
thesis that every reflective agent must claim rights 
for herself. De Roose charges, Gewirth moves. via 
the (also presumably uncontroversiaJ) principle of 
universalizability. to "all prospective agents who 
have purposes they want to fulfill have the rights of 
freedom and well-being." 23 De Roose quotes an 
early critic of Gewirth. Adina Schwartz. on this 
seemingly fatal flaw: 
Gewirth has only shown that each agent 
must claim rights for him/herself on 
prudential grounds. Therefore, each agent 
is only logically bound to admit that all 
other agents have sound prudential reasons 
for claiming those same rights for 
themselves. 2<1 
Recognizing that others claim the rights to freedom 
and well-being is not tantamount to accQrding them 
those rights. Hence, the rational agent is not 
inconsistent if she refuses to take the moral point of 
view. 
De Roose points out that R.M. Hare later pressed 
much the same objection: 
For if all he had shown was that an agent 
must claim that there is a prudential 
requirement on him to seek the necessary 
conditions for achieving ~ purposes, the 
universalization of this claim would only 
yield the claim that there is a prudential 
requirement on other similar agents in 
similar situations to seek the necessary 
conditions for achieving 1!lllli: purposes.25 
Clearly, the latter claim is not moral at all; it is as 
resoundingly prudential as the claim from which it 
was universalized. 
The charge that Gewirth has failed to bridge the 
gap between prudence and morality, pressed by 
Schwartz, Hare, and De Roose, is actually mistak.en. 
However. in his reply to Hare,26 Gewlrth fails to 
show that he can escape that charge. He agrees with 
Hare that (a) "there is a prudential requirement on 
Ian agent] to seek the necessary conditions for 
achieving his purposes" enlails (assuming 
universalizability), (b) "there is a prudential 
requirement on other similar agents to seek the 
necessary conditions for achieving .tlWr. purposes." 
He then argues that (b). when said by the agent 
referred to in (8), is actually a moral judgment. 
because it "lakes favorable account of the interests 
of persons other than or in addition to [the original 
agent!. "27 But this cannot be made out. An agent 
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who ~ay~ that it i5 in the intere~t5 of other agent~ to 
seek freedom and well-being takes neither favorable 
nor unfavorable account of the interests of those 
other agents; he or she simply makes an observation. 
Hitler, while no doubt realiZing that it was in the 
interests of his death camp victims to have freedom 
and well-being, was not exactly "taking favorable 
account" of their interests whenever this thought 
occurred to him! 
Gewirth, in trying to hoist Hare on his own 
prudential petard, concedes too much In accepting 
Hare's framework for discussion. He takes a step in 
the right direction when he stresses the importance 
of taking the agent's standpoint, but he does not put 
this step in the correct context. The claim to be 
universalized is the agent's. not an outside 
observer's description of the agent's claim. Hare 
(and Schwartz before him) assumes that "the agent 
claims the rights of freedom an well-beIng for 
herself on prudential grounds" must be Gewirth's 
prudential starting point on his path to the moral 
point of view, This starting point can indeed not be 
universalized into a moral claim. However, the 
actual claim to be universalized Is the agent's claim 
that "I have the rights to freedom and well-being 
because I am a prospective purposive agent" (step 5 
in our earlier sketch of Gewirth's argument). When 
this claim is universalized we get step 7: "all 
prospective purposive agents have the rights to 
freedom and well-being." This is a moral judgment 
because, by making it. the agent thereby accords 
rights to others. She does not merely observe that 
others illim. rights to freedom ~nd well-being 
because it is in their interests to do 50. The novelty 
and force of Gewirth's argument is due to his 
insistence that we take the agent's standpoint 
throughout. He does not need to show that the 
original agent has rights or that all agents have 
rights: he need only show that the renective agent 
must hold that she has rights. Once he has shown 
this (and De Roose himself calls this step "relatively 
uncontroversial" ). universalization leads to the 
agent's holdina that others with purposes they want 
to fulfill also have rights. The critics' mistake Is to 
confuse the agent's claim with someone else's report 
of that claim. 
De Roose's formulation of the objection allows us 
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to 5ee thi~ mi~take more clearly. He grants that 
Gewirth shows that "all (renectivel agents must 
claim for themselves the right to freedom and well-
being, " The agent, then, is said to judge that "I 
claim for myself rights to freedom and well-being." 
He rightly argues that "From (thisl judgment ... one 
can with the help of the logical principle of 
universalizability only infer a universalized 
prudential judgment and not a moral judgment," 28 • 
presumably the judgment that "other prospective 
agents similar to myself claim rights of freedom and 
well-being for themselves." But this misidentifies 
the judgment to be universalized. The statement that 
"all (renectivel agents must claim for themselves 
rights to freedom and well-being" does not imply 
that the agent thinks to herself "I claim the rights to 
freedom and well-being." This adds an extra layer 
of renection which need not at all be present. One 
claims the rights to freedom and well-being for 
oneself by saying or thinking "I have the rights to 
freedom and well-being." This statement is the 
rights-claim in question! Claiming a right and having 
a right are indeed two different matters. Since the 
agent must hold that she has rights, by Gewirth's 
argument, not merely that she claims rights, the 
judgment to be universalized is '" [on the grounds 
that I am a prospective purposive agent) have the 
rights to freedom and well-being." Gewirth does not 
commit the fallacy of equivocating "having a right" 
and "claiming aright" at all. On the contrary, the 
contention that "S claims rights" entails that S must 
think '" claim rights" commits the intentional 
fallacy. The third-person report of the agent's 
judgment is illicitly imported into the judgment 
itself. Gewirth's reasoning! therefore. has not been 
refuted by the objection Schwartz, Hare, and De 
Roose have raised. Unless he can be shown mistaken 
in some other respect. Gewirth appears to have 
shown that the rational, renective agent logically 
must hold that others in addition to herself have 
basic moral rights, 
Unfortunately, the above does not imply that 
agents with normal mental capacities will respect 
the rights of others. De Roose is skeptical of 
Gewirth"s claim that "the transition from the 
prudential to the moral and social is . . . not 
motivational but logical." 29 Even if Gewirth. as I 
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have argued. has successfully shown that 
consistency requires ttle agent to hold that others 
have rights. skepticism about the moral behaavior of 
agents is warranted. The agent must also be 
motivated or inclined to abide by the dictates of 
reason. She may be perfectly able to see that others 
have the rights that she claims for herself, and yet 
refuse to respect them. Plato notwithstanding. one 
may knowingly do evil: immoralists can exist. 
Gewirth raises a form of this objection himself. 
If. as David Hume has claimed, reason alone can 
compel to action. what else can motivate the agent to 
act morally? Why should the agent who realizes that 
she is logically committed to the rights of others lli 
50 as to respect those rlghts?30 Gewirth's answer 
here is that the agent "rationally must accept the 
PGC because it is entailed by another judgment he 
accepts."31 He adds that "by virtue of the PGC's 
being rationally justlfled. the ratlonal agent Is in fact 
motivated to accept it, since, being rational, he 
accepts what is rationally justified." 2 Well and 
good, but not all agents are thoroughgoingly rational. 
That is precisely the problem! Gewirth's reply 
plainly leaves any immoralists unscathed. 
Another group of problematic agents reject 
reason at an even earlier point than immoralists. 
They, while fully belieVing that they are entitled to 
rights to freedom and well-being, refuse to 
universalize beyond their own cases. These are the 
amoralists. Gewirth has devoted considerable 
attention to this group. beloved by critics such as 
Hare ,33 He succeeds in showing that the critics err 
in their claim that amoralists do not contradict 
themselves. Nevertheless, amoralists exist; logic 
does not overpower their lack of concern for others. 
The bad news (and not just for teachers of logic) 
is that agents are very frequently illogical. A 
number of social scientists recently have conducted 
studies which indicate that illogical. inconsistent 
processing of information is extremely common}" 
In view of this depressing fact, how can one expect 
agents not to be amoralists or immoralists? Why 
should they care about anyone other than 
themselves? 
These Questions are hardly new; as De Roose 
observes, we have been seeking the motivation for 
taking the moral. as opposed to the exclusively 
prudenttal, point of view for a very long time.35 
Psychology is needed to provide the answers, if 
indeed there are any. Hume anticipated 
psychologists when he argued that "feeling" rather 
than reason alone leads us to make moral 
distinctions.30 While we may doubt the mechanism 
he proposes for the operation of "the moral sense," 
it is difficult to deny that feeling has a central role. 
Simply put, caring about others motivates our moral 
concern for them. Psychologists who study moral 
development have amassed much evidence for the 
caring trait; it begins to appear almost as early as 
one's concern for oneself does. Jerome Kagan 
argues that empathy, the ability to imagine oneself in 
another's place, normally appears around the second 
year of life regardless of one's cullure. and it 
immediately reveals itself in some of the child's 
actions .37 Lawrence Kohlberg places the develop-
ment of II caring orientation in childhood as well.38 
We do not refrain from torturing innocenls simply 
because to do so violates rights which we are 
logically compelled to grant: we refrain because we 
are emotionally incapable of innicting undeserved 
agony, We do not need to read Gewirth to become 
convinced that we should try to help starving humans 
in Ethiopia; seeing their tortured, hopeless eyes and 
emaciated bodies is quite sufficient to spur our 
action. Nor do we need to reason to the PGC to 
realize that veal calves, for example, are tortured 
innocents. and lhat to eat lhem is an abomination. In 
short, we do care about others. This is, apparently, 
a trait we share with many nonhuman animals.39 
Human immoralists and amoralists have somehow 
fallen short or been "arrested," as a psychologist 
might say, in their moral development. 
Why, then. rely upon reason in moral matters? 
Why not trust our feelings instead? Conceptualizing 
the PGC is not necessary for us to taKe the moral 
point of view, /Snd those who refuse to go beyond 
prudence are, one might hold. not going to find it 
sufficient. Must we not try to reach their emotions 
instead? Do not tears win more moral battles than 
appeals to consistency? 
Perhaps they do. but the sad fact is that reliance 
upon feelings alone has led to many a moral 
abomination. Bigots are filled with fervent and 
totally illogical conviction. To very loosely 
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pllrllphrll~e ImmllnueJ Klint, rell~on without emotion 
may be impotent, but emotion without reason is 
blind. Without reason, although it is not a guarantee, 
one has little chance of avoiding delusion, prejudice, 
and arbitrariness. Anyone to whom truth and 
fairness is important should acknowledge the 
immense value of rationality. Properly understood, 
reason should inspire our passionate devotion. 
Herein lies the great value of Gewirlh's 
enterprise. He has shown that what many of us 
almost automatically feel to be true--that individuals 
who care about what happens to them have just as 
much right to freedom and well-being as we do--can 
be justified in the most stringent way. Some ears 
may well be deaf to the twin appeals of reason and 
emotion, but others can be reached. More than this 
we cannot ask. 
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